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ABSTRACT
Safety concerns on the deep neural networks (DNNs) have been raised when they are applied to
critical sectors. In this paper, we define safety risks by requesting the alignment of network’s decision
with human perception. To enable a general methodology for quantifying safety risks, we define a
generic safety property and instantiate it to express various safety risks. For the quantification of risks,
we take the maximum radius of safe norm balls, in which no safety risk exists. The computation of
the maximum safe radius is reduced to the computation of their respective Lipschitz metrics – the
quantities to be computed. In addition to the known adversarial example, reachability example, and
invariant example, in this paper we identify a new class of risk – uncertainty example – on which
humans can tell easily but the network is unsure. We develop an algorithm, inspired by derivative-free
optimization techniques and accelerated by tensor-based parallelization on GPUs, to support an
efficient computation of the metrics. We perform evaluations on several benchmark neural networks,
including ACSC-Xu, MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet networks. The experiments show that, our
method can achieve competitive performance on safety quantification in terms of the tightness and
the efficiency of computation. Importantly, as a generic approach, our method can work with a broad
class of safety risks and without restrictions on the structure of neural networks. We release our tool
in GitHub: https://github.com/TrustAI/DeepQuant for the community to use.
1 Introduction
In recent years, we witness significant progress has been made in AI, especially the deep neural networks that can
achieve surprisingly high performance on various tasks, including image recognition [1], natural language processing
[2], and games [3]. As a key component, deep neural networks have also been widely used in a range of safety-
critical applications such as fully- or semi-autonomous vehicles [4], drug discovery [5] and automated medical
diagnosis [6]. The applications of neural networks in safety-critical systems bring a new challenge. As recent research
demonstrated [7, 8], despite of achieving high accuracy, DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e., adding a
small perturbation to a genuine image will result in an erroneous output. Such phenomena essentially implies that,
∗This work is supported by the UK EPSRC projects on Offshore Robotics for Certification of Assets (ORCA) [EP/R026173/1]
and End-to-End Conceptual Guarding of Neural Architectures [EP/T026995/1], and ORCA Partnership Resource Fund (PRF) on
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neural network’s accuracy and its robustness may not be positively correlated [9]. As a result, it is extremely crucial
that a neural network model can be practically evaluated on its safety and robustness [10, 11, 12].
Many research efforts have been directed towards developing approaches to evaluate neural network’s robustness by
crafting adversarial examples [13, 14, 15, 16, 17], including notably FGSM [7], JSMA [18], C&W [19], etc. These
approaches can only falsify robustness claims, yet cannot verify, because no theoretical guarantee is provided on their
results. Originated from verification community recently, some research works have instead focused on robustness
evaluation with rigorous guarantees [20, 21], i.e., if no adversarial examples found, the proposed solution can guarantee
that DNN’s output is invariant to adversarial perturbation. These techniques rely on either a reduction to a constraint
solving problem by encoding the network as a set of constraints [22], an exhaustive search of the neighbourhood of an
image [23], or an over-approximation method [24], etc. However, these approaches can only work with small-scale
neural networks in a white-box manner2, and have not been able to work with a practical state-of-the-art neural networks
such as various ImageNet models. Moreover, most of them are dedicated for a particular single safety risk such as local
or point-wise robustness. Please refer to our recent survey for details [25].
In this regard, this paper works towards a generic quantification framework that is able to i) work with different classes
of safety risks; ii) provide guarantee on its quantification results; and iii) applicable to large-scale neural networks with
a broad range of layers and activation functions. To achieve these goals, we introduce a generic property expression
parameterised over the output of a DNN, define metrics over this expression, and develop a tool DEEPQUANT to
evaluate the metrics on DNNs. By instantiating the property expression with various specific forms and consider
different metrics, DEEPQUANT can evaluate different safety risks on neural networks including the local and global
robustness, as well as the decision uncertainty, a new type of safety risks that is firstly studied in this paper. Specifically,
the key technical contributions of this paper lie on the following aspects.
First, we study safety risks by assuming that network’s decision needs to align with human perception. Under this
assumption, we identify another class of safety risks other than the known ones – adversarial example [7], reachability
example [26, 27], and invariant example [28] – and name it as uncertainty example. Fig. 1 presents the intuition of
these safety risks. Different from adversarial example on which the network is certain about its decision (although the
decision is incorrect w.r.t. human perception), uncertainty example lies on the vicinity of the intersection point of all
decision boundaries (marked by red dashed line circle in Fig. 1) and should be without any confusion with human
perception. uncertainty are more difficult to evaluate than robustness because the intersection areas of all decision
boundaries are very sparse in the input space. The potential disastrous consequence of uncertainty example will be
discussed in the paper.
Second, to work with different safety risks in a framework, we introduce a generic safety property expression and
show that it can be instantiated to express various risks. The quantification of the risks is then defined as the maximum
radius of safe norm balls, in which no risk is present. Then, we show that, a conservative estimation of the maximum
radius can be done by computing a Lipschitz metric over the safety property.
Third, we develop an algorithm, inspired by a derivative-free optimisation technique called Mesh Adaptive Direct
Search, to compute the Lipschitz metric. The algorithm is able to work on large-scale neural networks and does
not require to know the internal weights or structures of DNNs. Moreover, as indicated in Fig. 2, our algorithm is
tensor-based, to take advantage of the significant capability of GPU parallelisation.
Finally, we implement the approach into a tool DEEPQUANT3 and validate it over an extensive set of networks,
including large-scale ImageNet DNNs with millions of neurons and tens of layers. The experiments show competitive
performance of DEEPQUANT in a number of benchmark networks with respect to state-of-the-art tools ReluPlex [22],
SHERLOCK [26], and DeepGO [27]: it is able to efficiently achieve tight bounds. Other than the performance, our
method can work without restrictions on the safety properties and the structure of neural networks. This is in contrast
with existing tools, for example ReluPlex and SHERLOCK can only work with small network with ReLU activation
functions and DeepGO can only work with robustness and reachability. In summary, the novelty of this paper lies on
the following aspects:
• This paper introduce a generic property expression that provides a principal and unified tool to quantify various
safety risks on deep neural networks.
• We theoretically prove that the proposed Lipschitzian robustness expression bounds the true robustness in
terms of classification-invariant space.
• This paper, as the the first research work, identifies a new type of risk of neural networks by uncertainty
examples, as well as provides an efficient method to locate such uncertainty spots.
2Namely, the structure and the internal weights of DNNs need to be known
3The software is provided via github: https://github.com/TrustAI/DeepQuant
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• We implement the proposed solution as a software tool - DEEPQUANT that is applicable to large-scale deep
neural networks including various ImageNet models.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Illustration of three safety risks - adversarial example [7], invariant example [28], and uncertainty example
(this paper). (b) An example to compare uncertainty example with adversarial example in MNIST. The First Row:
the first image is the raw input image, the second image is the uncertainty example (identified by our tool) and the third
image is the adversarial example; The Second Row: the corresponding output probabilistic distributions of DNNs on
raw input image and uncertainty example, and the adversarial perturbation.
2 Related Work
We now discuss some of the closely related work in safety properties of neural networks.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks
As recent works show that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples, there are constantly increasing number of
attacks to generate adversarial examples with new countermeasures [29]. Adversarial attacks apply heuristic search
algorithms to find adversarial examples. Starting from Limited-memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-BFGS)
algorithm [7], a number of adversarial attack algorithms have been developed, including notably FGSM [8], JSMA
[18], C&W attacks [19], RecurJac [30], one-pixel attacks [31], structured attack [32], binary attack [15] etc.
Most of current works are guided by the forward gradient or the gradient of the cost-function, which in turn rely on the
existence of first-order derivative, i.e., differentiability, of neural network. The method proposed in this paper relaxes
this assumption and can work with any neural network. Moreover, while adversarial attacks can falsify the robustness
of a neural networks, our method can also verify the robustness, thanks to its theoretically grounded approach of taking
a Lipschitzian metric with confidence interval expression as an indicator of the robustness. Finally, beyond robustness,
our metric is generic and can express other properties such as Uncertainty.
2.2 Safety/Formal Verification
How to verify whether a given/particular neural network satisfies certain input-output properties is a very challenging
task. Traditional verification of neural networks mainly focus on measuring the networks on a large collections of
points in the input space and checking whether the outputs are as desired. However, due to the infinite of input space,
it is not workable to check all possible inputs. Some networks may be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, although
they can perform well on a large sample of inputs and not correctly extend to new situations. The recent advances
of neural network verification include the layer-by-layer exhaustive search approach [23], methods using constraint
solvers [33, 22], global optimisation approaches [34, 27, 35, 36], the abstract interpretation approach [24, 37, 38], linear
programming (LP) [39] or mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) [40], semi-definite relaxations [41], Lipschitz
optimization [42, 43], and combining optimization with abstraction [44]. The properties studies include robustness
[23, 42], reachability (i.e., whether a given output is possible from a given subspace of inputs) [26], and properties
expressible with SMT constraints [33, 22].
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Verification approaches aim to provide guarantees on the obtained results. However, they cannot provide efficient
solutions to large-scale neural networks. For example, constraint-based approaches such as Reluplex can only work
with neural networks with a few hundreds hidden nodes [33, 22, 45]. Exhaustive search and global optimisation suffer
from the state-space or dimensionality explosion problem [23, 27]. Different from these solutions, the quantification
method proposed in this paper can work efficiently on large-scale neural networks against Lipschitzian properties.
3 Safety Risks in Neural Networks
A (feed-forward and deep) neural network can be represented as a function f : Rn → Rm such that given an input
x ∈ Rn, it outputs a probabilistic distribution over a set of m labels {1...m}, representing the probabilities of assigning
labels to the input. We use fj(x) to denote the probability of labelling an input x with the label j. Based on this, we
define the labelling function l : Rn → {0...m} as
l(x) =
{
k |fk(x)−maxj 6=k fj(x)| > 
0 otherwise (1)
where k = maxj fj(x) is the label with the greatest confidence and  is a threshold value. Intuitively, if there is a label
k ∈ {1...m} with significant confidence comparing to other labels j 6= k, we assign x with the label k. On the other
hand, if there is no label with significant confidence comparing to other labels, we assign x with the label 0, denoting
that the network is not confident about its own decision.
In practice, a neural network is a complex, highly nonlinear function composed of a sequence of simple, linear or
nonlinear functional mappings [46, 47]. Typical functional mappings include fully-connected, convolutional, pooling,
Softmax, and Sigmoid. In this paper, we treat the network as a blackbox and therefore can work with any internal layer
and architecture as long as the network is feedforward.
Safety Risk: By training over a labelled dataset, a network f is to simulate the decisions of a human O : Rn → {0...m}
on unseen inputs, where O(x) = 0 represents that the human cannot decide on its labelling. Therefore, the safety risk
of f lies on the inconsistency of decisions between f and O, as defined in Definition 1 and Definition 2.
Definition 1 (Misalignment on Decision). Given a network f : Rn → Rm, a human decision oracleO : Rn → {0..m},
and a legitimate input x ∈ Rn such that l(x) = O(x) 6= 0, we have the Table-1 for xˆ being another input that is
perturbed from x.
Table 1: Categories of safety risks by the alignment of neural network decisions with human perception. Uncertainty
examples are for the first time studied in this paper.
O(xˆ) = 0 O(xˆ) = O(x) 0 6= O(xˆ) 6= O(x)
l(xˆ) = 0 no error Uncertainty example Uncertainty example
0 6= l(xˆ) = l(x) adversarial example [7] no error invariant example [28]
0 6= l(xˆ) 6= l(x) adversarial example [7] adversarial example [7] no error
Intuitively, each entry in Table-1 represents a possible scenario for x and xˆ. For example, those entries on the diagonal
represent that no obvious error can be inferred. For the case where 0 6= l(xˆ) 6= l(x) and O(xˆ) = O(x), human believes
that the two inputs are in the same class but the network believes not, representing a typical case of adversarial example
[7]. The two entries with O(xˆ) = 0 represent the scenarios where human is uncertain about xˆ while the network has
high confidence about it. They are also seen as adversarial examples. Moreover, invariant example [28] occurs when
x and xˆ are labelled as the same while human believes they should belong to different classes. Finally, uncertainty
example, to be discussed for the first time in this paper, covers two entries where the network is uncertain when human
can clearly differentiate.
Uncertainty may lead to safety concern in practice. For example, it has been well discussed that adversarial examples
[7] may lead to disastrous consequences. For example, in a shared autonomy scenario where a human driver relies on a
deep learning system to make most of the decisions and expects its handing over of the control only when necessary,
the deep learning system may act confidently (i.e., l(xˆ) 6= 0) when human believes that it should perform the other
action (i.e., O(xˆ) = O(x) = l(x) 6= l(xˆ)) or ask for the transfer of control back to human (i.e., O(xˆ) = 0). These are
adversarial examples. On the other hand, the Uncertainty example suggests the other serious consequence: it is possible
that the deep learning system intends to hand back the control (since l(xˆ) = 0) while the human driver believes the
deep learning is able to handle it very well and loses her concentration (cf. Tesla incident and Uber incident).
Besides the risks from the mis-alignment of prediction decisions (i.e., adversarial example, invariant example, and
uncertainty example), we have the following:
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Definition 2 (Misalignment on Rigidity of Classification Probability). Given fj(x) and a pre-specified constant , it is
possible that human may expect the unreachability of fj(x) +  under certain perturbation on x, while neural network
can. We call those perturbed inputs xˆ that satisfy fj(xˆ) ≥ fj(x) +  reachability examples.
Norm Ball: In Definition 1, we use “xˆ being another input that is perturbed from x” to state that xˆ is close to x. This is
usually formalised with norm ball as follows.
B(x, d, p) = {xˆ| ||xˆ− x||p ≤ d} (2)
Intuitively, B(x, d, p) includes all inputs that are within a certain distance to x. The distance is measured with Lp-norm
such that ||x||p = (
∑n
i=1 x
p
i )
1/p. The “certain perturbation on x” in Definition 2 is also formalised in this way.
4 Quantification of Safety Risks
In this paper, we consider three safety risks: adversarial example, uncertainty example, and reachability example. First
of all, we take a generic definition of safety property.
Definition 3. A safety property s(x) is an expression over the outputs {fi(x) | i ∈ {1...m}} of the neural network, and
we expect that whenever s(x) < 0, the neural network has safety risk.
In the following, we show how to instantiate s(x) with specific expressions in order to quantify the robustness, the
reachability, and the uncertainty.
4.1 Robustness Quantification
Firstly, a norm ball B(x, d, p) is a safe norm ball if l(xˆ) = l(x) for all xˆ ∈ B(x, d, p). Moreover, a norm ball B(x, d, p)
is a targeted safe norm ball w.r.t. a pre-specified label l if l(xˆ) 6= l for all xˆ ∈ B(x, d, p). Intuitively, a safe norm ball
requires all the inputs within it to have the same label as the center point x, while a targeted safe norm ball is to avoid
having any input to have a specific label l.
Based on safe norm balls, we define the robustness as below.
Definition 4 (Robustness). Given a network f , an input x, and a norm ball B(x, d, p), the robustness of f on x and
B(x, d, p) is to find the maximum radius d′ that can make B(x, d′, p) safe. More specifically, B(x, d′, p) is a safe norm
ball, and for all d′′ > d′, B(x, d′′, p) is not a safe norm ball. We use R(x, d, p) to denote such a maximum safe radius
d′, and call it robustness radius.
It is noted that R(x, d, p) ≤ d. Intuitively, the robustness of f on x and B(x, d, p) is evaluated with the maximum
radius of safe norm balls, which are centered at x and within the norm ball B(x, d, p). We remark that, accurately
calculating the robustness is extremely difficult in a high-dimensional space, see e.g., [7, 22].
Below, we instantiate the safety property s(x) with Confidence Interval expression, which can be used to quantify the
robustness.
Definition 5 (Confidence Interval Expression). Let f be a network, x an input, and l1, l2 ∈ {1...m} two labels, we
define confidence interval expression as follows:
sCI(x)(l1, l2) = fl1(x)− fl2(x)−  (3)
where  ∈ [0, 1] specifies the minimum confidence interval required by the user.
According to Definition 3, we use s(x) < 0 to express the existence of potential risks. Therefore, intuitively, the
expression sCI(x)(l1, l2) suggests a safety specification that the confidence gap between labels l1 and l2 on input x
has to be larger than a pre-specified value . Depending on the concrete safety requirements, a user may instantiate
l1, l2, and  into different values. We can instantiate l1 and l2 and obtain the following concrete confidence-interval
expressions:
• Case-1: sCI(x)(j1, j2), where for some other input x0 6= x, j1 = arg maxj fj(x0) is the label with the
greatest confidence value and j2 = arg maxj 6=j1 fj(x0) is the label with the second greatest confidence value;
• Case-2: sCI(x)(j1, l) for some given label l;
• Case-3: sCI(x0)(j1, jm), where jm = arg minj fj(x0) is the label with the smallest confidence value.
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Intuitively, the above expression maintain different types of discrepancies between two confidence values of an input x.
In particular, the expression sCI(x)(j1, j2) in Case-1 is closely related to the resistance of DNNs to untarget adversarial
attacks. Expression in Case-2 is reflect the robustness to target adversarial attacks. In both cases, we may use  = 0, to
denote a mis-classification, or assign  with some value to make sure that the network mis-classifies with high confidence
(a more serious scenario). And expression in Case-3 instead captures the largest variation between confidence values.
While sCI(x)(j1, j2) provides an expressible way to specify whether an input directly leads to the safety risk, we need
to show how to use this expression for the purpose of evaluating robustness. Below, we define a Lipschitzian metric.
Definition 6 (Lipschitzian Metric). Given an expression s(x), a norm ball B(x, d, p) centered at an input x, we let
Q(s, x, d, p) be a Lipschitzian metric, defined as follows.
Q(s, x, d, p) = sup
xˆ∈B(x,d,p)
|s(x)− s(xˆ)|
||x− xˆ||p (4)
Intuitively, the metric is, based on a given point x, to find the greatest changing rate within the norm ball B(x, d, p).
The following theorem shows that, the robustness radius R(x, d, p) can be estimated conservatively if the Lipschitzian
metric can be computed.
Theorem 1. Given a neural network f , an input x, and a norm ball B(x, d, p), we have that, B(x, d′, p) is a safe norm
ball when d′ =
s(x)
Q(s, x, d, p)
≤ d.
Proof. By the robustness definition in Definition 4, we need to have
∀θ : ||θ||p ≤ d′ ⇒ s(x+ θ) ≥ 0 (5)
Since neural networks are Lipschitz [27], we have that, for all x+ θ ∈ B(x, d, p),
|s(x)− s(x+ θ)| ≤ Q(s, x, d, p) ||θ||p (6)
We consider two possible cases: s(x + θ) ≥ s(x) or s(x + θ) < s(x). For the case of s(x + θ) ≥ s(x), it is
straightforward that s(x+ θ) ≥ 0, since s(x) ≥ 0 by the safety requirement. For the case of s(x+ θ) < s(x), we have
that
s(x)−Q(s, x, d, p) ||θ||p ≤ s(x+ θ) (7)
To ensure s(x+ θ) ≥ 0, it is sufficient to have s(x)−Q(s, x, d, p) ||θ||p ≥ 0. By ||θ||p ≤ d′, it is sufficient to have
s(x)−Q(s, x, d, p) d′ = 0. Therefore, if we have d′ = s(x)/Q(s, x, d, p) then Eqn. (5) holds, i.e., B(x, d′, p) is a safe
norm ball.
Moreover, we require that d′ ≤ d, since otherwise Eqn. (6) may not hold. Intuitively, this is because the computation of
Q(s, x, d, p) is conducted within B(x, d, p), and hence any result based on it may not work over a greater norm ball.

The above theorem suggests that, we can use s(x)/Q(s, x, d, p) to conservatively estimate the robustness radius
R(x, d, p). It is known that s(x) is trivial, so the estimation of robustness radius R(x, d, p) is reduced to the estimation
of Lipschitz metric Q(s, x, d, p).
4.2 Uncertainty Quantification
As explained in Definition 1, adversarial examples – the risk for robustness – are not the only class of safety risks.
In this section, we study another type of safety risk, i.e., uncertainty examples. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first time this safety risk is studied. We remark that, the study of this risk becomes easy, owing to our approach
of taking a generic expression s(x). Also, its estimation and detection can take the same algorithm as the robustness
quantification. That is, it comes for free.
Since uncertainty examples represent those inputs on which the network f cannot have a clear decision, we need to
express the uncertainty of the distribution f(x). This can be done by considering the Kullback-Leibler divergence [48]
(or KL divergence) from f(x) to e.g., the uniform distribution or another distribution f(xˆ).
Definition 7 (Uncertainty Expression). Let f be a network and x an input, we write
sU (x) = −−
m∑
l=1
1
m
logmfl(x) (8)
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where  > 0 is a bound representing, from the DNN developer’s view, what is the smallest KL divergence from the
uniform distribution for x to be classified as a good behaviour. Moreover, if consider the other distribution f(xˆ) as the
basis, we have sU (x, xˆ) = −−
∑m
l=1
1
m log
fl(x)
fl(xˆ)
.
Intuitively, the uniform distribution indicates that the network is unsure about the input. Therefore, in Eqn. (8), we
require as a necessary condition, for the decision on x to be safe, that the KL divergence from f(x) to the uniform
distribution (expressed as −∑l 1m logmfl(x)) is greater than . If so, it is believed that the network behaves well on
the input x. We remark that, the computation of uncertainty example of this kind can be difficult because it lies on the
vicinity of the intersection point of all decision boundaries (as illustrated in Fig. 1) and such areas are sparse in the
input space.
Moreover, sU (x, xˆ) requires that the decision of x is significantly far away from xˆ. That is, it allows a user-defined
safety risk f(xˆ) and asks for the network decision to stay away from the risks.
Based on the expressions, we can also define safe norm balls by requiring that no input in a norm ball satisfies s(x) < 0.
The definition of maximal safe norm ball can also be extended to this context, and we can define the uncertainty metric
the same as that of Definition 6. Without loss of generality, we will continue use B(x, d, p) and Q(s, x, d, p) to denote
them, respectively. As before, a conservative estimation of the maximum radius B(x, d, p) of safe norm balls can be
reduced to the computation of Q(s, x, d, p). Therefore, the study of uncertainty quantification comes for free if we
are able to work with the robustness quantification.
4.3 Reachability Quantification
For reachability, we can define the following expression: sR(x)(l) = fl(x) − , where  ∈ (0, 1) is a pre-specified
threshold for the rigidity of classification probability. Other notions such as B(x, d, p) and Q(s, x, d, p) follow the
discussion in Section 4.1.
5 Risk Quantification Algorithms
In this section, we consider practical method to calculate the metricQ(s, x, d, p) as in Definition 6. Instead of basing our
method on gradient-based adversarial attack or the formal analysis via encoding of neural networks – as we discussed
in the related work (Section 2), we consider derivative-free optimisation methods, which can efficiently search over
samples in B(x, d, p). We remark that, we use robustness –Q(s, x, d, p) and B(x, d, p) – as example, and the algorithms
work with uncertainty and reachability.
Given a trained DNN f , a property expression s : Rm → R, and a genuine x ∈ Rn, the Lipschitzian metric can be
calculated by solving the following optimization problem:
minxˆ w(xˆ) s.t. ||xˆ− x||p ≤ d and xˆ ∈ [0, 1]n (9)
where w(xˆ) = ||xˆ − x||p/|s(xˆ) − s(x)|. The optimization problem contains a non-convex objective (due to the
non-convexity of DNNs), together with a set of constraints. Note that, for p ∈ {1, 2}, the constraints include both
nonlinear inequality constraints and box-constraints, and for p =∞, the constraints include only with box-constraints.
The optimization is based on a composition of the DNN f and the property expression s, both of which may be
non-differential or not smooth. The analytic form of its first-order derivative is also difficult to get. Methodologically,
to achieve the broadest applications, we need a single optimization method that can efficiently estimate different DNN
properties for various property expressions regardless its differentiability, smoothness, or whether an analytic form
of derivative exits. In this regard, instead of using gradient-based method, we take a derivative-free optimization
framework. Our optimization solutions are centered around the Mesh Adaptive Direct Search (MADS) [49], which is
designed for black-box optimization problems for which the functions defining the objective and the constraints are
typically seen as black-boxes [50]. It requires no gradient or derivative information but still provides a convergence
guarantee to the first-order stationary points based on the Clarke calculus [51, 49, 50].
In the following, we will present an algorithm for L∞ norm (Section 5.1), enhance the algorithm with tensor-based
parallelisation for GPU implementation (Section 5.2), and present an algorithm for L1 and L2 norm (Section 5.3).
5.1 L∞-norm Risk Quantification
First, we introduce MADS in the context of risk quantification based on L∞-norm. When p =∞, we can transform
Eqn. (9) into the following problem:
min
xˆ
w(xˆ) s.t. ld ≤ xˆ ≤ ud (10)
7
A PREPRINT - SEPTEMBER 15, 2020
where ld = max{x − d, 0}, ud = min{x + d, 1}. Instead of presenting the details of MADS [49], we give its idea.
Briefly, MADS seeks to improve the current solution by testing points in the neighborhood of the current point (the
incumbent). Each point is one step away in one direction on an iteration-dependent mesh. In addition to these points,
MADS can incorporate any search strategy into the optimization to have additional test points. The above process
iterates until a stopping condition is satisfied.
Formally, each iteration of MADS comprises of two stages, a SEARCH stage and an optional POLL stage. The SEARCH
stage evaluates a number of points proposed by a given search strategy, with the only restriction that the tested points
lie on the current mesh. The current mesh at the k-th iteration is Mk =
⋃
x∈Sk
{
x+ ∆meshk zD
(i)|z ∈ N,D(i) ∈ D
}
,
where Sk ⊂ Rn is the set of points evaluated since the start of the iteration, ∆meshk ∈ R+ is the mesh size, and D is a
fixed matrix in Rn×nD whose nD columns represent viable search directions. We let D(i) be the i-th column of D. In
our implementation, we let D = [In,−In], where In is the n-dimensional identity matrix.
The POLL stage is performed if the SEARCH fails in finding a point with an improved objective value. POLL constructs a
poll set of candidate points, Pk, defined as Pk =
{
xk + ∆
poll
k D
(i)|D(i) ∈ Dk
}
, where xk is the incumbent and Dk is
the set of polling directions constructed by taking discrete linear combinations of the set of directions D. The poll size
parameter ∆pollk ≥ ∆meshk defines the maximum length of poll displacement vectors ∆meshk D(i), for D(i) ∈ Dk (typically,
∆pollk ≈ ∆meshk ‖v‖). Points in the poll set can be evaluated in any order, and the POLL is opportunistic in that it can be
stopped as soon as a better solution is found. The POLL stage ensures theoretical convergence to a local stationary point
according to Clarke calculus for nonsmooth functions [50].
If either SEARCH or POLL succeeds in finding a mesh point with an improved objective value, the incumbent is updated
and the mesh size remains the same or is multiplied by a factor τ > 1. If neither SEARCH or POLL is successful, the
incumbent does not move and the mesh size is divided by τ . The algorithm proceeds until a stopping criterion is met
(e.g., maximum budget of function evaluations).
5.2 Tensor-based Parallelisation for L∞-norm Risk Quantification
For the problem as in Eqn. (9), objective function w(xˆ) includes neural network f(xˆ). Given the availability of
tensor-based algorithmic operations in deep learning frameworks such as TesnorFlow, PyTorch, and Caffe, etc, we
improve the algorithm described in Section 5.1 with a tensor-based parallelization, so as to achieve computational
efficiency with GPU. As shown in Fig. 2, with a low-end Nvidia GTX1050Ti GPU, to evaluate a 16-layer MNIST DNN
on 1,000 images, the time using tensor-based parallelization is 25 times faster than without using one. Specifically, our
new algorithm – enhancing MADS with parallelization – can improve the speed roughly (nk +mk)/2 times in terms
of DNN inquiry numbers, where nk and mk – to be introduced below – are such that nk is around ≥ 2n depends on the
search strategy and iterations and mk is at least ≥ n+ 1.
Figure 2: Number of queries to the DNN w.r.t. the number of images, with and without tensor-based parallelization – a
significant motivation for our tensor-based parallelisation algorithm.
Comparing to the traditional MADS in [49], we perform the following improvements in terms of parallelization in
both SEARCH and POLL stages. Algorithm-1 provides the pseudo-code for the Parallelised algorithm.
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Algorithm 1: Tensor-based Parallelised MADS (TP-MADS)
Input: Objective function w(x), starting point x0, variable constraint ld and ud
Initialization: ∆mesh0 ← 2−10, ∆poll0 ← 1, k ← 0, evaluate w(x) on initial design
while fevals > MaxFunEvals or ∆pollk < 10
−6 do
Stack {xk1 , xk2 , ..., xknk} ∈Mk into a tensor formatMk;
Evaluate w(x) onMk via parallelization;
if SEARCH is NOT successful then
Stack Pk = {xk1 , xk2 , ..., xkmk} into a tensor format Pk;
Evaluate function w(x) on Pk via parallelization;
end
if Iteration k is successful then
Update incumbent xk+1;
if POLL was successful then
∆meshk ← 2∆meshk , ∆pollk ← 2∆pollk ;
else
∆meshk ← 12∆meshk , ∆pollk ← 12∆pollk
end
end
Update k ← k + 1
end
Output: xend = arg mink w(xk) and w(xend)
• Parallelisation in SEARCH Stage: Assuming at k-th iteration, there are nk hyper-points, i.e., {xk1 , xk2 , ..., xknk} ∈
Mk, We stack all those hyper-points into a 3-D TensorMk such thatMk(i, j, k) is the i-th element in xkj .
Then we feedMk into the GPU to perform the DNN evaluation.
• Parallelisation in POLL Stage: Assuming at k-th iteration, there are mk points in set Pk = {xk1 , xk2 , ..., xkmk}.
We stack all those hyper-points into a 3-D Tensor Pk such that Pk(i, j, k) is the i-th element in xkj . Then we
feed Pk into the GPU to perform the DNN evaluation.
5.3 L1 and L2- norm Risk Quantification
For L1 or L2-norm, we need to solve an optimization problem with box-constraint as well as nonlinear inequality
constraints, as shown in Eqn. (9). We take an Augmented Lagrangian Algorithm [52] to solve a nonlinear optimization
problem with nonlinear constraints, linear constraints, and bounds. Specifically, bounds and linear constraints are
handled separately from nonlinear constraints. We transform the constrained optimization problem into an unconstrained
problem by combining the fitness function and nonlinear constraint function using the Lagrangian and the penalty
parameters, as below:
Θ(x, λ, s) = w(x)− λq log(q + c(x)), (11)
where x ∈ [0, 1]n, λ > 0 is a Lagrange multiplier, q > 0 is a positive shift, and c(x) = ||x−x0||p−d where p ∈ {1, 2}.
Algorithm-2 provides the pseudo-code to solve the L1 and L2-norm risk quantification problem. The idea of the
algorithm is as follows. It starts by initialising parameters λ and q. Then, we minimise a sub-problem, which has
fixed values for λ and q and is solved by calling Tensor-based Parallelised Mesh Adaptive Direct Search as shown
in Algorithm-1. When the subproblem is minimised to a required accuracy and satisfies feasibility conditions, the
Lagrangian estimate (Eqn. (11)) is updated. Otherwise, the penalty parameter λ is increased by a penalty factor, together
with an update on q. This results in a new sub-problem formulation and minimization problem. The above steps (other
than the initialisation) are repeated until a stopping criteria are met.
6 Experimental Results
First, in Section 6.1, by comparing with several state-of-the-art tools on the reachability quantification, we show the
efficiency of DEEPQUANT. Then, in Section 6.2, by conducting robustness quantification on networks of different
9
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Algorithm 2: TP-MADS with Inequality Constraints
Input: Objective function w(x), starting point x0, inequality constraint function c(x), variable constraint ld = 0 and
ud = 1
Initialization: Initialize q and λ
while Termination criteria not satisfied do
Call for Algorithm-1 to solve a Sub-problem Eqn. (11);
Update Lagrange multiplier estimate λ;
Update positive shift q;
end
Output: xend = arg minx,λ,qΘ(x, λ, q) and w(xend)
scales, over datasets MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, we show the tightness of results and the scalability of
DEEPQUANT. Finally, in Section 6.3, we conduct experiments on uncertainty quantification 4.
6.1 Experiments on Reachability Quantification
Three state-of-the-art tools are considered. Reluplex [22] is an SMT-based method for DNNs with ReLU activations;
we apply a bisection scheme to achieve the reachability quantification. SHERLOCK [26] is a MILP-based method
dedicated to reachability quantification on DNNs with ReLU activations. DeepGO [27] is a general reachability
quantification tool that can work with a broad range of neural networks including those with non-ReLU activation
layers.
We followed the experimental setup in [26] and trained ten neural networks, including six ReLU networks and four
Tanh networks (i.e., networks with tanh activations). Note that, neither SHERLOCK nor Reluplex can work with
Tanh networks (i.e., tanh-NN-6 to tanh-NN-9). For ReLU networks, i.e., ReLU-NN-0 to ReLU-NN-5, the input has
two dimensions, i.e., x ∈ [0, 10]2. The input dimensions for tanh-NN-6 to tanh-NN-9 are gradually increased, from
x ∈ [0, 10]2 to x ∈ [0, 10]5. For fairness of comparison, we also implement DEEPQUANT in Matlab2018a, running
on a Laptop with i7-7700HQ CPU and 16GB RAM. The software and hardware setup are made exactly the same as
DeepGO [27]. Both Reluplex5 and SHERLOCK6 are configured to run on a different software platform and a more
powerful hardware platform – a Linux workstation with 63GB RAM and a 23-Core CPU. We record the running time
of each tool when its reachability error is within 10−2. The comparison results are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Comparison with SHERLOCK [26], Reluplex [22] and DeepGO [27].
NN ID Layer×Neuron SHERLOCK Reluplex DeepGO DEEPQUANT
ReLU-NN-0 1×100 1.9s 1m 55s 0.4s 1.80s
ReLU-NN-1 1×200 2.4s 13m 58s 1.0s 1.56s
ReLU-NN-2 1×500 17.8s Timeout 6.8s 1.21s
ReLU-NN-3 1×500 7.6s Timeout 5.3s 1.26s
ReLU-NN-4 1×1000 7m 57.8s Timeout 1.8s 1.21s
ReLU-NN-5 6×250 9m 48.4s Timeout 15.1s 2.81s
tanh-NN-6 (2-input) 6×250 N/A N/A 14.8s 2.93s
tanh-NN-7 (3-input) 6×250 N/A N/A 58.7s 8.92s
tanh-NN-8 (4-input) 6×250 N/A N/A 394.1s 20.94s
tanh-NN-9 (5-input) 6×250 N/A N/A 2680.4s 129.81s
From Table 2, our tool DEEPQUANT is consistently better than SHERLOCK and Reluplex. For the six ReLU-
based networks, DEEPQUANT has an averaged computation time of around 1.6s, which has 108-fold and 300-fold
improvement over SHERLOCK and Reluplex (excluding timeouts), respectively. Furthermore, the performances
of both Reluplex and SHERLOCK are considerably affected by the increase of neuron numbers and layers, while
DEEPQUANT does not. Although both DeepGO and DEEPQUANT can work on Tanh networks, DeepGO is significantly
more sensitive to the dimension of the input space, with the computation time is nearly exponential w.r.t. the input
dimension. Thus, for a neural network with high dimensional inputs, DEEPQUANT demonstrates significant superiority
4The software will be found at https://github.com/TrustAI/DeepQuant
5https://github.com/guykatzz/ReluplexCav2017
6https://github.com/souradeep-111/sherlock
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over DeepGO. For example, for the neural network tanh-NN-9 (with five input dimensions), DEEPQUANT is nearly 20
times faster.
In summary, DEEPQUANT exhibits better efficiency than Reluplex, SHERLOCK, and DeepGO. It is less sensitive to
the size of network and the input dimensions.
6.2 Experiments on Robustness Quantification
6.2.1 ACSC-Xu Networks
The first experiment is performed on a 5-input and 5-output ACSC-Xu neural networks [22]. We aim to validate
the accuracy – or tightness – of DEEPQUANT on robustness quantification. From this section, all experiments are
conducted on a PC with i7-7700HQ CPU, 16GB RAM, and GPU GTX1050Ti. DNNs are trained with the Neural
Network Toolbox in MATLAB2018a. The ACSC-Xu neural network is trained on a simulated dataset and includes
5 fully-connected layers, ReLU activation functions, and overall it contains 300 hidden neurons [22]. The five input
variables of ACAS-Xu neural network are shown in Fig. 3 ( which are obtained from various kinds of sensors [53]),
where ρ (m) presents Distance from ownship to intruder, θ (rad) is Angle to intruder relative to ownship heading
direction, ψ (rad) shows Heading angle of intruder relative to ownship, vown (m/s) and vint (m/s) display Speed of
ownship and intruder respectively.
Figure 3: Geometry for ACAS Xu Horizontal Logic Table (from [22]).
We adapt the safety verification tool DEEPGO [27] for the computation of ground-truth robustness quantification values.
Moreover, we implement the other baseline method – a random sampling (RS) method, which uniformly samples
5× 105 images in a given norm ball.
Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 4 (b) present the comparison on the accuracy and the query number, respectively, over different
norm distance (L∞, L1 and L2). We see that DEEPQUANT can almost reach the ground-truth accuracy value computed
by DeepGO (as in Fig. 4 (a)), but with much less number of queries (as in Fig. 4 (b)). Precisely, DEEPQUANT takes
around 2× 103 DNN queries, while DEEPGO requires around 1.3× 104 DNN queries – 6 times difference. Moreover,
DEEPQUANT performs much better than RS, on both the tightness and the efficiency. In other word, this experiment
exhibits both the tightness of the result and the efficiency of the computation.
6.2.2 MNIST and CIFAR-10 Networks
We train a 9-layer DNN on MNIST dataset and a 10-layer DNN on CIFAR-10 dataset. They achieve 99.4% and 78.3%
testing accuracy respectively, which are comparable to the state-of-the-art [54] without data augmentation or other layer
modifications. Table 3 and Table 4 present the model structures of MNIST DNN and CIFAR-10 DNN respectively.
Table 5 shows the detail information about training dataset and training parameter setups on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Fig. 5 shows the robustness quantification results for L1, L∞-norm and L2-norm respectively on 10 input images
(selected from testing dataset) for the MNIST network. The norm balls for these three different robustness quantification
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: (a) Accuracy comparison of Robustness Quantification for L∞, L1 and L2-norm on the ACSC-Xu network.
(b) Comparing DNN inquiry numbers when using different methods for robustness quantification on the ACSC-Xu
network.
Table 3: Structure of MNIST DNN. The pipeline consists of Convolution layer (Conv), Batch-Normalization layer
(Batch), and Fully Connected layer (FC).
Layer Type Number of Channels Filter Size Stride Value Activation Output Size
Conv1 1 3× 3× 16 1 ReLU 28× 28× 16
Conv2 + Batch 16 3× 3× 32 1 ReLU 28× 28× 32
Conv3 + Batch 32 3× 3× 64 1 ReLU 28× 28× 64
Conv4 + Batch 64 3× 3× 128 1 ReLU 28× 28× 128
Dropout - - - - 28× 28× 128
FC - - - ReLU 256
Dropout - - - - 256
FC - - - Softmax 10
are set as d = 250, d = 0.3 and d = 8 respectively. For random sampling we sampled 1,000,000 images in the norm
ball to evaluate Q(s, x, d, p) based on Definition 6. We can see that, DEEPQUANT performs consistently better while
using tens of times less DNN queries. Please note, in this experiment, DeepGO is not included due to its limitation on
scalability. From the Fig. 5, we can see that the proposed robustness quantification method is consistently better than
random sampling. Moreover, in our experiment, even through random sampling approach samples 106 images, it still
cannot achieves an accurate robustness evaluation.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: (a) Comparison of L1-norm robustness quantification on a MNIST deep neural network, d = 250. (b)
Comparison of L∞-norm robustness quantification on a MNIST deep neural network, d = 0.3. (c) Comparison of
L2-norm robustness quantification on a MNIST deep neural network, d = 8.
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Table 4: Structure of CIFAR-10 DNN. The pipeline consists of Convolution layer (Conv), Max Pooling (MaxPool), and
Fully Connected layer (FC).
Layer Type Number of Channels Filter Size Stride Value Activation Output Size
Conv1 3 3× 3× 32 1 ReLU 32× 32× 32
Conv2 32 3× 3× 32 1 ReLU 30× 30× 32
MaxPool 32 2× 2× 32 2 - 29× 29× 32
Conv3 32 3× 3× 64 1 ReLU 29× 29× 64
Conv4 64 3× 3× 64 1 ReLU 27× 27× 64
MaxPool 64 2× 2× 64 2 - 26× 26× 64
Dropout - - - - 26× 26× 64
FC - - - ReLU 512
FC - - - Softmax 10
Table 5: Detailed information about MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset.
Dataset Training Set Size Testing Set Size Testing Accuracy Parameter Optimization Setup
MNIST 60, 000 10, 000 99.41% Max Epochs=35, Batch=128, optimizer=SGDM
CIFAR-10 50, 000 10, 000 78.30% Epochs=50, Batch=128, optimizer=SGD
We might also be interested in targeted robustness quantification, which essentially measures the hardness of fooling
input images into a given target label. For the CIFAR-10 network, Fig. 6 (a) gives the evaluation results for label-1 as
the target label. We can see that label-3 is the most robust while label-7 is the least robust.
(a) (c)
Figure 6: (a) Targeted robustness evaluation using DEEPQUANT on a CIFAR-10 DNN, with label-1 as the target
label. We use LX-L1 on the X-axis to indicate the targeted robustness value from label-X to label-1. (b) Comparison of
robustness values of five ImageNet DNNs on an input image using DEEPQUANT.
Moreover, Fig. 7 gives some images returned by DEEPQUANT (i.e., xˆ in Eqn. (4) while evaluating the robustness
of MNIST and CIFAR-10 networks. The MNIST images in Fig. 7 (a) are generated when performing L∞, L1 and
L2-norm robustness evaluation. The CIFAR-10 images in Fig. 7 (b) are images found by DEEPQUANT when gradually
increasing the norm ball radius (i.e., d in Q(s, x, d, p)) from 0.1 to 0.4. It shows that the visual difference w.r.t. input
image becomes more obvious for a larger d due to the monotonicity of local robustness value w.r.t. the norm-ball radius.
Those images essentially exhibit where the confidence interval decreases the fastest in their corresponding norm balls.
We remark that, they are different from adversarial examples, and showcase potentially important robustness
risks of a network.
That is, DEEPQUANT can be used to study variants of safety properties.
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(a) (b)
Figure 7: (a) MNIST images in the first two rows are examples returned by DEEPQUANT, i.e., xˆ in Eqn. (4). From Left
to Right: it indicates the original image, images by using L∞-norm, L1-norm, and L2-norm robustness metric. (b)
CIFAR-10 images in the last two rows are examples returned by DEEPQUANT for an input image by increasing the
L∞-norm ball radius d = 0.1 : 0.05 : 0.4.
6.2.3 ImageNet Networks:
In Fig. 6 (b), we measure the robustness of five ImageNet models, including AlexNet (8 layers), VGG-16 (16 layers),
VGG-19 (19 layers), ResNet50 (50 layers), and ResNet101 (101 layers), on a L∞-norm ball for a chosen feature (i.e., a
50× 50 square). We can see that, for this local norm space and the chosen feature, ResNet-50 achieves best robustness
and AlexNet is the least robust one. This experiment shows the scalability of DEEPQUANT in working with large-scale
networks.
In addition, we also presents a case study showing how to use DEEPQUANT to guide the Design of Robust DNN
Models by using robustness quantification. We train six DNNs on MNIST dataset (see their model structure details in
Fig. 8, which mainly includes convolution layer (conv), batch-normalization layer (batchnorm), and fully connected
layer (fc)). The DNNs range from with shallow layers (e.g., DNN-1) to deep layers (e.g., DNN-6). We randomly
choose 100 images and use DEEPQUANT to evaluate their L∞-norm robustness. Table-6 presents the result of five input
images and the mean robustness values. Based on the robustness statistics, a DNN builder can choose suitable DNNs
for different tasks with balance of accuracy and robustness. For example, for a non-critical application that requires
high accuracy, DNN-6 is the most suitable one; for a safety-critical application, DNN-2 is a good choice; DNN-4 and
DNN-5 however have good balance on accuracy and robustness.
Table 6: L∞-norm robustness quantification results on six MNIST DNNs given five input images.
Img-1 Img-2 Img-3 Img-4 Img-5 Mean Test Acc.
DNN-1 45.90 93.73 30.44 39.76 93.33 60.63 97.75%
DNN-2 35.24 21.66 19.79 26.82 57.30 32.16 97.95%
DNN-3 87.13 69.40 78.31 84.71 100.30 83.97 98.38%
DNN-4 42.07 46.42 69.90 46.86 63.42 53.73 99.06%
DNN-5 53.68 54.17 82.78 41.21 65.75 59.52 99.16%
DNN-6 96.91 70.13 75.53 64.63 80.19 77.48 99.41%
6.3 Experiments on Uncertainty Quantification
We adopt the same MNIST and CIFAR-10 networks as those in Section 6.2. The detailed experimental setup can be
found in Table 5.
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Figure 8: Model Structures of MNIST DNNs from DNN-1 to DNN-6. The filter size of conv_1, conv_2 and conv_3 are
3× 3× 32, 3× 3× 64, and 3× 3× 128 respectively. The probability of dropout is 0.5.
In Fig. 9 (a), we first showcase what is an uncertainty example. The top row is for a true image which has a high KL
divergence to uniform distribution, and the bottom is for the uncertainty image found by DEEPQUANT in a L∞-norm
ball (d = 0.4). From human perception, the uncertainty image should certainly have the same label as the original one.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 9: (a) KL divergence between DNN’s output distribution with uniform distribution for a true image and an
uncertainty image. (b) Uncertainty values quantified by DEEPQUANT on six MNIST DNNs on a given L∞-norm ball.
(c) Uncertainty examples on MNIST and CIFAR-10 dataset in a L∞-norm ball of radius d = 0.4.
In Fig. 9 (b), we use DEEPQUANT to quantify uncertainty for the six MNIST networks (see Fig. 8 for the details of
their structures), while gradually increasing norm-ball radius from 0 to 0.5. We see that, the uncertainty of networks
vastly worsens with the increase of norm-ball radius. At d = 0.15, DNN-1 and DNN-2 show worse uncertainty than
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other networks. Fig. 9 (c) gives some uncertainty examples captured by DEEPQUANT on MNIST and CIFAR-10 neural
networks.
In Fig. 10, we visualise several intermediate images obtained during a search for an uncertainty image in a L∞-norm
ball with d = 0.1. From left to right, the true image is perturbed by DEEPQUANT with an optimization objective of
minimising the KL divergence. With the perturbations, the generated images have gradually increased uncertainty
related to this specific input. When the KL divergence is reduced to 0, the network is completely confused and does
not know how to classify the uncertainty example. Thus, DEEPQUANT is the very first tool that can insightfully and
automatically reveal this new, yet very important, safety property in the decision process of a network.
Figure 10: Intermediate images obtained during the searching for an uncertainty image in a L∞-norm ball with d = 0.1.
From left to right, the KL divergence is gradually decreased.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a novel method DEEPQUANT– based on a generic Lipschitz metric and a derivative-free optimisation
algorithm – to quantify a set of safety risks, including a new risk called uncertainty example. Comparing with state-of-
the-art methods, our method not only can work on a broad range of risks but also returns tight result comparing to the
ground truth. Our tool DEEPQUANT is optimized by tensor-based parallelisation, which could run efficiently on GPUs,
and thus is scalable to work with large-scale networks including MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet models. We envision
that this paper provides an initial yet important attempt towards the risk quantification concerning the safety of DNNs.
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